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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Jacob Douglas Keene appeals from the district court’s order revoking his 
probation and imposing a commuted sentence.     
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
In 2008, pursuant to a plea agreement, Keene pled guilty to felony driving 
under the influence.  (R., pp.72-77.)  The state agreed to dismiss two other 
charges arising from the same incident.  (Id.)  The district court imposed a unified 
seven-year sentence with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
placed Keene on probation for seven years.  (Id.)  The court also ordered that 
Keene serve 180 days in the Ada County Jail.  (Id.) 
In 2010, the state charged Keene with misdemeanor domestic assault.  
(PSI, pp.5, 49-51); see also Idaho Data Repository, State v. Keene, Ada County 
District Court Case No. CR-2010-08511.  Keene ultimately pled guilty to an 
amended charge of disturbing the peace in that case.  See id.  Based upon this 
criminal conduct, and Keene’s failure to pay required child support, fines, fees, 
and restitution, the state filed its first motion for probation violation in Keene’s 
felony driving under the influence case.  (R., pp.94-96.)   Keene admitted that he 
violated his probation by committing the crime of disturbing the peace.  (R., pp.95, 
109-110.)  The district court revoked and reinstated Keene’s probation.  (R., 
pp.111-115.)    
In January 2011, the state filed its second motion for probation violation.  




methamphetamine by failing to appear for a scheduled meeting with his 
supervising officer.  (R., pp.160-161.)  The district court revoked Keene’s 
probation and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.170-172.)  Three months later, the 
district court again suspended Keene’s sentence and placed him on probation.  
(R., pp.176-180.) 
In June 2012, the state filed its third motion for probation violation.  (R., 
pp.199-202.)  Keene admitted that he violated his probation by consuming 
alcohol on multiple occasions.  (R., pp.199-202, 208.)  The district court revoked 
and reinstated Keene’s probation and ordered that Keene successfully complete 
the drug court diversion program.  (R., pp.212-217.) 
Keene participated in the drug court program over the next 28 months.  (R., 
pp.223-245.)  In November 2014, the state filed a motion to discharge Keene 
from drug court.  (R., pp.249-252.)  The state alleged 22 violations of Keene’s 
drug court agreement.  (Id.)  Keene admitted 13 of the violations, including that 
he failed to attend several required meetings, engaged in a romantic relationship 
with another drug court participant, missed scheduled urinalysis tests, and 
possessed three bottles of Zyprexa, an antipsychotic medication.  (1/6/15 Tr., 
p.13, Ls.1-25.)  The state agreed to withdraw the remaining allegations, but 
reserved the right to discuss all but one of them in making its disposition 
argument.  (1/6/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.19-21.)  After a hearing, the district court 
discharged Keene from the drug court program “for failing to adhere to Drug 




The state filed its fourth motion for probation violation based upon Keene’s 
failure to successfully complete drug court.  (R., pp.246-248.)   After an 
evidentiary hearing at which the state submitted the district court’s order 
discharging Keene from the drug court program, the court found that Keene had 
violated his probation in the manner alleged by the state.  (2/3/15 Tr., p.4, L.17 – 
p.6, L.13.) 
At the conclusion of the probation violation evidentiary hearing, Keene 
requested that the district court set out the disposition hearing to give him the 
opportunity to obtain records from the drug court staff regarding Keene’s 
participation in that program.  (2/3/15 Tr., p.6, L.16 – p.8, L.10; see also R., 
pp.265-266.)  The court granted the request and ordered the drug court staff to 
provide this information to Keene.1  (R., pp.265-266.)  These treatment records 
indicated that Keene disclosed his possession of the Zyprexa during the drug 
court intake process.  (Confidential Exhibit, pp.7, 21-22, 34-35.)   
At the probation disposition hearing, the district court acknowledged 
Keene’s disclosure of the Zyprexa.  (3/10/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.17-24.)  However, the 
court noted that the Zyprexa issue was ultimately “not why [it] made the decision 
for the discharge [from drug court].”  (3/10/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.24-25.)  Keene 
requested that the district court place him back on probation, or in the alternative, 
to commute his sentence.  (3/10/15 Tr., p.13, L.20 – p.14, L.3.)  Citing the length 
of time Keene had taken to progress through the drug court program, and 
                                                 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Keene’s motion to augment the appellate 
record with the treatment records provided by the drug court staff.  (8/25/15 
Order.)  Citations to page numbers of this “Confidential Exhibit” correspond with 





Keene’s struggles to comply with the requirements of community supervision and 
drug court in the years since his 2008 felony DUI conviction, the district court 
revoked Keene’s probation.  (R., pp.269-272; 3/10/15 Tr., p.19, L.1 – p.22, L.12.)  
The court commuted Keene’s unified seven-year sentence to 730 days in the 
Ada County Jail, with credit for 440 days, leaving 290 days to serve.  (R., pp.269-
272; 3/10/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.11-22.)  Keene timely appealed.  (R., pp.290-292.)  
Keene has since completed his sentence in this case.  See Idaho Data 






 Keene states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Keene’s probation, because the district court’s decision was 
tainted by factual error regarding Mr. Keene’s disclosure of 
the Zyprexa to the drug court? 
 
2. Did the district court commit fundamental error when it 
revoked Mr. Keene’s probation, because the district court’s 
decision was tainted by the drug court’s legal error in basing 
the decision to discharge in part on Mr. Keene’s supposed 
lack of progress in drug court? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.11.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Are Keene’s arguments on appeal moot? 
 
2. Has Keene failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by revoking his probation? 
 
3 Has Keene failed to demonstrate that the district court’s revocation of his 








Keene’s Arguments On Appeal Are Moot 
 
  “An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.”  State v. Barclay, 
149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted).  The mootness 
doctrine precludes review when “the issues presented are no longer live or the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”  Idaho Schools for 
Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ.,128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 
649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 
(1991)). 
 Keene has raised two issues in this case, both of which challenge the 
district court’s decision to revoke probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)  As 
Keene notes (Appellant’s brief, p.10 n.6), he has completed his commuted 
sentence in this case.  See also Idaho Data Repository, State v. Keene, Ada 
County District Court Case No. CR-2008-00324.  Even if this Court were to 
determine that the district court erred by revoking Keene’s probation, such a 
determination would have no practical effect on the outcome of this case 
because Keene has completed his sentence, and thus, there is no longer a 
sentence to suspend.  Keene therefore lacks a legally cognizable interest in the 
outcome of this appeal.    
 The state is aware of State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490 n. 3, 835 P.2d 
1299, 1301, n. 3 (1992), in which the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the state’s 




probation became moot after Russell was subsequently released on parole.  The 
Court noted that, had Russell been released on probation rather than parole, and 
had he then successfully completed his term of probation, he would have had the 
opportunity to request that the district court reduce his felony conviction to a 
misdemeanor.  Id.  Additionally, the penalties for violating a condition of probation 
can be less severe than that for a parole violation.  Id.  Thus, Russell still had a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome of his challenge to the district court’s 
decision to revoke his probation. 
 In this case, if the district court placed Keene back on probation following 
his discharge from drug court, and if Keene then successfully completed this 
term of probation, he could have requested, after his discharge from probation, 
that the district court reduce his felony DUI conviction to a misdemeanor 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(3).  This subsection, which was enacted in 2013, 
permits defendants to request the district court to reduce their felony convictions 
to misdemeanors after they are discharged from probation, regardless of whether 
the defendant previously violated the terms of his probation.2  Id.      
While both Keene and Russell could have theoretically requested that the 
district court reduce their felony convictions to misdemeanors (if they were 
reinstated onto probation and successfully completed probation), the facts of 
Russell are distinguishable from the facts of this case.  Unlike Keene, Russell 
was still on parole under the supervision of the Idaho Department of Correction at 
the time his challenge to the district court’s revocation of his probation was 
                                                 






considered by the Idaho Supreme Court.  See Russell, 122 Idaho at 490 n. 3, 
835 P.2d at 1301, n. 3.  Russell, unlike Keene, was therefore not attempting to 
resurrect a completed sentence.    
 In any event, notwithstanding Russell and the relief theoretically available 
to Keene pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(3), the state asserts that Keene’s challenge 
to the district court’s revocation of his probation is moot under the circumstances 
of this case.  Keene has no “legally cognizable” interest in the outcome of this 
appeal because it is extremely likely that he will be in a worse position if he is 
successful.  Keene, who has completed his sentence in this case, is requesting 
that this Court vacate the commutation and revocation order and, presumably, 
give him the opportunity to request that the district court place him back on 
probation, where he would again be subject to the liberty restrictions of 
community supervision, and where he would face the possible imposition of a 
multi-year prison sentence if he was once again unsuccessful on probation.  
Further, even in the event that Keene successfully completed probation, it is very 
unlikely that the district court would be willing to reduce his conviction in light of 
Keene’s extensive criminal history, numerous failures on community supervision, 
and failure to successfully complete the drug court program.  (See PSI, pp.1-6.)  
Thus, there is, in a practical sense, no clearly identifiable or cognizable relief 
available to Keene.   
 Additionally, at the probation violation disposition hearing, Keene 
requested that the district court either place him back onto probation or impose a 




permitted to manufacture a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this 
appeal by seeking to vacate an outcome he requested.3 
 Because Keene has already completed his sentence in this case, the 
issues he raises on appeal are moot.  This Court should therefore decline to 
consider these issues. 
 
II. 
Keene Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 




 Keene contends that the district court abused its decision by revoking his 
probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14.)  A review of the record and applicable 
law reveals that the district court acted well within its discretion in revoking 
Keene’s probation after Keene committed multiple probation violations and was 
discharged from drug court.  Therefore, in the event that this Court determines 
that this issue is not moot, it should affirm the determination of the district court. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992).  “When a 
trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
                                                 
3 For similar reasons, Keene’s challenges to the district court’s revocation of his 
probation are precluded by the invited error doctrine.  See State v. Abdullah, 158 
Idaho 386, ___, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (“The invited error doctrine precludes a 
criminal defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting district court action and then 




conducts a mulch-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Keene’s 
Probation 
 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988).  In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.  State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. 
In this case, Keene concedes that there was substantial evidence in the 
record to support the district court’s finding that he violated his probation by 
failing to successfully complete drug court.  (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)   However, 
Keene argues that the district court’s decision to revoke his probation in light of 
this violation constituted an abuse of discretion because the decision was based 




to revoke his probation was based upon Keene’s possession of bottles of 
Zyprexa during his participation in drug court, when, as the treatment records 
revealed, Keene disclosed his possession of the Zyprexa during the drug court 
intake process.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-15; Confidential Exhibit, pp.7, 21-22, 34-
35.) 
Keene’s contention fails.  By the time of the probation revocation 
disposition hearing, the district court was aware of, and expressly acknowledged, 
that Keene disclosed the Zyprexa during the drug court intake process.  (3/10/15 
Tr., p.18, Ls.17-25.)  After noting that the Zyprexa issue was ultimately not why it 
chose to discharge Keene from drug court (3/10/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.24-25), the 
district court summarized the reasons for its decision to revoke Keene’s probation.   
The court noted that Keene had a “rough go” through drug court and had been in 
the program for a significant length of time.  (3/10/15 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-15.)   The 
court explained that, from its experiences presiding over drug court, a 
participant’s ability to benefit from the program becomes limited if they are in the 
program for too long.  (Id.)  The court acknowledged and discussed Keene’s 
mental health issues, and the danger Keene poses to the community.  (3/10/15 
Tr., p.19, L.16 – p.20, L.1; p.20, L.19 – p.21, L.4.)  The court also recognized that 
Keene’s conviction was, by then, more than seven years old, and that Keene had 
spent much of that time in and out of jail after failing to comply with the terms of 
community supervision and drug court.  (3/10/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-10.) 
The district court also acknowledged that Keene had experienced some 




and not facing any new charges for driving under the influence.  (3/10/15 Tr., p.20, 
Ls.12-18.)  Accordingly, while it revoked probation, the district court also 
commuted Keene’s seven-year unified sentence to 730 days in the Ada County 
Jail, 440 of which he had already served.  (R., pp.269-272; 3/10/15 Tr., p.21, 
Ls.11-22.) 
The district court’s decision is supported by the record.  Notwithstanding 
the Zyprexa issue, Keene admitted 12 other violations of his drug court 
agreement.  (1/6/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-25.)  Prior to his enrollment in drug court, 
Keene violated his probation numerous times.  (R., pp.111-115, 170-172, 212-
217.)  Keene also has an extensive criminal history, which includes four 
convictions for driving under the influence, four convictions for unlawfully carrying 
a concealed weapon, and convictions for providing false information, resisting 
and obstructing an officer, possession of marijuana, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, driving on a suspended license, and disturbing the peace (which 
was amended from misdemeanor domestic assault).  (PSI, pp.3-6, 48-51.)         
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Keene was no longer a viable candidate for community 
supervision.  Keene’s criminal history and repeated failures to comply with the 
requirements of community supervision and drug court did not entitle him to yet 
another opportunity on probation.  Keene has therefore failed to establish that the 








Keene Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court’s Revocation Of His 




 Keene contends that the district court committed fundamental 
constitutional error by revoking his probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-21.)  
Keene has failed to show any error, let alone fundamental error, in the district 
court’s decision to revoke his probation.  Therefore, in the event that this Court 
determines that this issue is not moot, it should affirm the determination of the 
district court. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate courts of this state will only review unpreserved assertions 
of error under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).   
 
C. The District Court Did Not Commit Error, Let Alone Fundamental Error, In 
Revoking Keene’s Probation 
 
Because Keene failed to raise a constitutional due process challenge to 
the district court’s revocation of his probation below, he must demonstrate 
fundamental error on appeal.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  To do so, 
Keene must demonstrate: (1) a constitutional violation; (2) that the violation is 
clear and obvious without the need for additional information not contained in the 





“The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process 
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”  State v. 
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010).  In the context of 
parole and probation violation hearings, the Idaho Supreme Court has set forth 
the due process requirements as follows: 
In Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)], the Supreme Court 
held that before the government could revoke a parolee’s parole, 
due process requires the following: 
 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; 
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; 
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral 
and detached” hearing body such as a traditional 
parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the 
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons 
for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no 
thought to equate this second stage of parole 
revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is 
a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible 
enough to consider evidence including letters, 
affidavits, and other material that would not be 
admissible in an adversary criminal trial. 
 
408 U.S. at 489.... 
 
 With regard to the revocation of probation, the Court 
subsequently held that “a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a 
preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions 
specified in Morrissey.”  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782... 
(1973). Thus, the State “must provide the same process [found in 
Morrissey] when terminating a probationer from probation.” [State v.] 




[(2007)].  As a fundamental matter, this Court has affirmed the 
Morrissey and Gagnon holdings that “[p]robationers do not enjoy 
the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded criminal 
defendants.”  State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 
(2007).  Nevertheless, “a probationer has a protected liberty 
interest in continued probation, and is therefore entitled to due 
process before probation may be revoked” - thus, we look first to 
Morrissey and Gagnon for those minimum due process 
requirements.  Id. at 766, 171 P.3d at 257. 
 
State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 870-871, 292 P.3d 258, 261-262 (2012) 
(footnote omitted).   
 Under Morrissey, Gagnon and Scraggins, the “notice” required for due 
process in probation revocation hearings is “written notice of the claimed 
violations of [probation].”  Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that drug court 
termination proceedings require the same restricted due process protections 
provided to parolees and probationers.  State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 740-743, 
170 P.3d 881, 883-886 (2007). 
In this case, while Keene challenges the district court’s revocation of his 
probation, he does not claim that he was directly deprived of due process at his 
probation revocation disposition hearing.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.15-21.)  
Instead, he asserts that the district court committed constitutional error at the 
probation revocation disposition hearing by basing its decision to revoke 
probation upon the court’s previous decision to discharge Keene from drug court.  
(Id.)  This previous decision, Keene asserts, violated his due process rights.   (Id.)  
Specifically, Keene asserts that the district court erred by basing its decision to 
discharge him from drug court on a ground which was not referenced in the 




progress through the program.  Keene has failed to satisfy the Perry fundamental 
error standard with regard to this claim. 
First, Keene cannot show clear constitutional error because he has not 
cited any cases standing for the proposition he raises in this case – that a district 
court violates constitutional due process at a probation disposition hearing when 
it bases its determination upon the result of a previous hearing, at which, Keene 
asserts, due process was not provided.  The relevant cases cited above do not 
require district courts to verify and ensure that due process was provided at all 
previous sentencing hearings, probation revocation hearings, or diversionary 
program discharge hearings which may influence its contemporaneous 
determination.   
Second, even if the process and notice provided to Keene at the drug 
court discharge hearing was somehow constitutionally relevant to the question of 
whether the district court violated Keene’s due process rights at the subsequent 
probation revocation disposition hearing, Keene has failed to show that he was 
deprived of due process at the discharge hearing.  The district court did not 
conclude that Keene violated his drug court agreement by failing to complete it 
within some period of time.  Instead, the court considered this as a factor in 
making its disposition determination of whether to discharge Keene from drug 
court after it had concluded that he was in violation of the drug court agreement.  
(R., pp.257-261.)  Keene has not cited any caselaw standing for the proposition 
that a district court commits constitutional error when it considers factors other 




court in making its ultimate determination whether to grant the motion.  The state 
asserts that once it has been established that a defendant has violated the drug 
court agreement, it is entirely appropriate for the court to consider a wide range 
of factors including a defendant’s character, criminal history, safety of the 
community, record on community supervision and drug court, etc., just as it would 
be entitled to do in a probation disposition or sentencing hearing.  See Upton, 
127 Idaho at 275, 899 P.2d at 985; Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; 
Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717; State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105-
107, 233 P.3d 33, 36-38 (2009).  Keene has therefore failed to satisfy the first 
prong of Perry because he has not established clear constitutional error. 
Keene has also failed to satisfy the third prong of the Perry fundamental 
error test because he has failed to show prejudice.  As discussed above, the 
district court’s decisions to discharge Keene from drug court and revoke his 
probation were supported by a multitude of factors, including Keene’s admissions 
to 12 violations of his drug court agreement (separate from the allegation 
pertaining to the Zyprexa issue), numerous probation violations, and Keene’s 
significant criminal history.   
Keene has failed to demonstrate error, let alone clear fundamental 
constitutional error, in the district court’s decision to revoke his probation.  This 










 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order revoking Keene’s probation 
 DATED this 29th day of March, 2016. 
   
 _/s/ Mark W. Olson______ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
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